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TRAFFIC JUSTICE:  ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE 
AND EQUITABLE TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT 
IN THE AGE OF VISION ZERO 
Marco Conner* 
“No goal is more ambitious than zero [traffic fatalities], but at the 
same time no other goal is acceptable.” 1 – New York City Mayor Bill 
de Blasio 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, more than 40,000 people lost their lives in traffic crashes in 
the United States,2 marking the third consecutive year of increases in 
traffic fatalities.3  Many view increased police traffic enforcement and 
more aggressive prosecution as part of the solution to this violent 
pandemic,4 in part because driver actions—like speeding, texting, and 
driver inattention—contribute to an estimated ninety-four percent of 
those traffic crashes.5  At the same time, a recent shift in public 
discourse has shined a light on decades of racially disparate policing 
and criminal justice practices.6  Horrific high-profile killings of 
African-Americans during police traffic stops reveal only the surface 
of our troubled race relations and a failed enforcement and criminal 
justice system in the United States, where Black7 drivers are far more 
                                                                                                            
 2. STAT. DEP’T, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, NSC MOTOR VEHICLE FATALITY 
ESTIMATES 1 (2016), http://www.nsc.org/NewsDocuments/2017/12-month-
estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/KEQ9-QFNE]. 
 3. See id.; Fatality Facts:  Yearly Snapshot 2015, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY 
SAFETY (Nov. 2016), http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/general-
statistics/fatalityfacts/overview-of-fatality-facts [https://perma.cc/S6NN-3NAX]. 
 4. See CITY OF N.Y., VISION ZERO ACTION PLAN 19 (2014) [hereinafter VISION 
ZERO ACTION PLAN], http://www.nyc.gov/html/visionzero/pdf/nyc-vision-zero-action-
plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLN3-E472]. 
 5. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CRITICAL 
REASONS FOR CRASHES INVESTIGATED IN THE NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH 
CAUSATION SURVEY 1 (2015), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/View
Publication/812115 [https://perma.cc/SSA6-N2PL]. 
 6. See generally Will Greenberg, Here’s How Badly Police Violence Has 
Divided America, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 19, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/
media/2017/03/police-shootings-black-lives-matter-history-timeline 
[https://perma.cc/VF8T-2LW5]; Matt Pearce, Activists Come Up With a Plan to End 
Police Killings. Here It Is., L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-police-campaign-zero-20150821-story.html [https://perma.cc/YTX7-
7CQL]. 
 7. This Article uses the terms Black and African-American interchangeably. 
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likely than White drivers to be stopped by police,8 even though 
contraband is possessed less often by those Black drivers,9 and where 
“African-Americans are far more likely than whites and other groups 
to be the victims of use of force by the police.”10 
In recent years, many cities have renewed their efforts to reduce 
traffic fatalities and serious injuries, some setting the bold goal of 
eliminating them altogether.11  In New York City (“NYC”) and 
elsewhere, this goal, named Vision Zero, has become government 
policy, for which police traffic enforcement is considered a vital 
component.12  However, given the racial inequities in our criminal 
justice system, the disparate stops of Black drivers, and fatal 
outcomes of traffic stops, cities and transportation planners must ask 
whether they can defend promoting police traffic enforcement and 
increased prosecution to achieve their goals of preventing traffic 
deaths and injuries.  Critically, they must ask whether such measures 
work, and whether there are more effective alternatives to current 
practices. 
This Article examines the role of traffic enforcement, analyzes its 
efficacy to deter dangerous driving, and suggests a new framework for 
traffic enforcement suited to the goals of Vision Zero.  It argues that 
the primary goal of Vision Zero-related traffic enforcement must be 
to create long-lasting general deterrence of dangerous driving 
behavior if cities are to reduce crashes and eliminate traffic fatalities 
and serious injuries.  Significantly, the Article highlights deterrence 
theories and concepts of fairness as central to understanding solutions 
to dangerous driving. 
                                                                                                            
 8. See Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of 
Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html [https://perma.cc/3JNL-
QXWP]; see also infra Section III.A.3. 
 9. LaFraniere & Lehren, supra note 8; see also Robin Shepard Engel & Jennifer 
M. Calnon, Examining the Influence of Drivers’ Characteristics During Traffic Stops 
with Police:  Results from a National Survey, U. OF CINCINNATI ONLINE MASTER SCI. 
CRIM. JUST. (2004), http://cjonline.uc.edu/resources/criminal-justice-research/
examining-the-influence-of-drivers-characteristics-during-traffic-stops-with-police-
results-from-a-national-survey [https://perma.cc/Z5ZK-AG2R]. 
 10. Timothy Williams, Study Supports Suspicion that Police Are More Likely to 
Use Force on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/08/us/study-supports-suspicion-that-police-use-of-force-is-more-likely-for-
blacks.html [https://perma.cc/FDL2-QAER]. 
 11. See Elevating Efforts in Vision Zero Cities Across the U.S., VISION ZERO 
NETWORK, http://visionzeronetwork.org/about/elevating-efforts-in-vision-zero-cities-
across-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/4YQG-TUKA]. 
 12. See, e.g., VISION ZERO:  YEAR THREE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38. 
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The enforcement policies advanced in this Article focus on 
deterring future dangerous driving, in line with the goal of Vision 
Zero.  Therefore, retributive justice, that is, punishment imposed 
without an extrinsic social purpose, is not discussed.  The role of 
public prosecutors will only be discussed tangentially, even though 
prosecutor’s offices play an important role in enforcing dangerous 
driving offenses.  Additionally, physical changes to road 
infrastructure, so-called engineering measures, will only occasionally 
be discussed, even though such measures are critical to changing 
dangerous driving behavior and mitigating human driver error.13 
Finally, this Article references several policies and examples from 
NYC related to traffic crashes and enforcement.  The city serves as a 
useful example of the challenges and possible solutions to address the 
pandemic of traffic violence in primarily urban and suburban settings.  
NYC is home to a variety of road users, representing within one 
jurisdiction the majority of different travel forms used throughout the 
United States, including driving, walking, bicycling, and public 
transportation.  And in a curious twist of fate, the city that registered 
the country’s first pedestrian fatality in 1899,14 was also the first U.S. 
city to adopt the Vision Zero policy in 2014 to address traffic crashes, 
with a focus on risks to pedestrians and other vulnerable road users.15  
Despite the loss of more than 4500 lives to traffic violence in NYC 
since 2001,16 the city has bucked the recent national trend of 
increasing traffic fatalities since 2014, with drops in traffic fatalities 
over three consecutive years since 2014, likely due to its Vision Zero-
related measures that include re-designing roads, lowering the city-
wide speed limit, and operating automated speed enforcement 
cameras.17  NYC also has a history of racially disparate policing and 
                                                                                                            
 13. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 14. Christopher Robbins, NYC’s First Car Accident in 1896 Involved a Bicycle, 
GOTHAMIST (May 14, 2012), http://gothamist.com/2012/05/14/nycs_first_car_accident
_in_1896_inv.php [https://perma.cc/Z8M5-VUPT]. 
 15. See VISION ZERO ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 19, 22.  “Vulnerable road 
user” is “a term applied to those most at risk in traffic . . . . Pedestrians, pedal cyclists, 
and motorcyclists are accordingly considered as vulnerable since they benefit from 
little or no external protective devices that would absorb energy in a collision.  They 
constitute with almost no exception the weak party in a road traffic crash.” Aymery 
Constant & Emmanuel Lagarde, Protecting Vulnerable Road Users from Injury, 
PLOS MED., Mar. 30, 2010, at 1, http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1000228 [https://perma.cc/Y9AJ-JLJA]. 
 16. See Archives of Statistical Summaries, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 
https://dmv.ny.gov/about-dmv/archives-statistical-summaries [https://perma.cc/PYJ2-
KD2L]. 
 17. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, New York Traffic Deaths Dip Again. It’s Not 
Enough, Mayor’s Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
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criminal prosecution practices18 and has drastically increased its 
police enforcement of certain traffic-related violations,19 offering 
insight into the challenges and opportunities of enforcement in 
addressing dangerous driving behavior and the U.S. pandemic of 
traffic violence. 
I.  THE U.S. PANDEMIC OF TRAFFIC VIOLENCE 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the man-made 
pandemic of traffic violence has swept across the United States, 
killing and injuring people of all ages on highways and city streets.  
Henry H. Bliss is believed to be the first pedestrian killed in vehicular 
traffic in the United States; he died after being struck by a motorist 
on Broadway in NYC in 1899.20  In that year, twenty-six people were 
killed in traffic nationwide.21  A decade later, in 1910, that number 
had increased to nearly 1600, then in 1925 to nearly 21,000, and, in 
1972, the highest year on record, to nearly 55,000 people annually.22  
On average, approximately 42,000 people died in traffic crashes 
nationwide every year between 1950 and 2009, primarily as motor 
vehicle occupants in vehicle-on-vehicle collisions or as pedestrians or 
                                                                                                            
2017/01/10/nyregion/new-york-traffic-deaths-vision-zero.html [https://perma.cc/63M5-
9W8S]; see CITY OF N.Y., VISION ZERO YEAR TWO:  YEAR END REVIEW 5, 12 (2015), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/visionzero/assets/vz-year-end-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2VQ-Z87X]. 
 18. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(finding NYC’s stop-and-frisk program unconstitutional); see also BESIKI 
KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., RACE & PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 
(2014), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race-and-
prosecution-manhattan-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7PJ-NWAX] (summarizing 
a report showing racially disparate results throughout the prosecution process); Irene 
Chidinma Nwoye, Cycling on the Sidewalk:  The New Stop-and-Frisk?, VILLAGE 
VOICE (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/cycling-on-the-sidewalk-
the-new-stop-and-frisk-6703521 [https://perma.cc/7RQE-AX67].  
 19. See VISION ZERO:  YEAR THREE REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. 
 20. Robbins, supra note 14. 
 21. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES IN 
2008 27 (2010), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811346 
[https://perma.cc/FN5B-UKS5].   
 22. See id.  However, adjusted for population growth, the traffic fatality rate 
dropped by ninety percent from 18 per 100 million vehicle miles traveled in 1925 to 
1.7 per 100 million vehicle miles traveled in 1997. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, Motor-Vehicle Safety:  A 20th Century Public Health Achievement, 48 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 369, 369-70 (1999), http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/PDF/wk/mm4818.pdf [https://perma.cc/SR23-KKCS]. 
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bicyclists struck by motorists.23  After several years of overall decline, 
estimates indicate that traffic deaths increased in 2016 to more than 
40,000, marking the second consecutive year of annual increases for 
the first time in at least fifteen years,24 with an estimated economic 
cost to society of more than $432 billion.25  Although the annual U.S. 
traffic fatality rate (the number of fatalities as part of the overall 
population) has declined significantly since the 1970s, Americans are 
still more likely to die in traffic than from firearms,26 and as recently 
as 2010, motor vehicle crashes were either the top- or second-leading 
cause of injury-related death for every age group aged one year and 
older.27 
The context of these deaths tends to differ between dense urban 
and non-urban environments.  On highways and outside cities, most 
traffic fatalities result from collisions between motorists traveling at 
high speeds, while within cities, especially in dense urban settings in 
cities like NYC, the majority of deaths and injuries occur when 
pedestrians are struck by motor vehicles either traveling at high 
speeds or when drivers fail to yield to vulnerable road users.28  In 
NYC, more than 4500 people have died in traffic crashes since 2001, 
at least 49,000 have suffered serious injuries (including loss of limbs, 
                                                                                                            
 23. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., HIGHLIGHTS 
OF 2009 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES 1 (2010), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/
Public/ViewPublication/811363 [https://perma.cc/4RVN-YDE4]. 
 24. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., EARLY 
ESTIMATE OF MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES FOR THE FIRST 9 MONTHS OF 
2016 2 (2017), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812358 
[https://perma.cc/L7EA-TV6Q]; STAT. DEP’T, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, NSC MOTOR 
VEHICLE FATALITY ESTIMATES, [hereinafter NSC FATALITY ESTIMATES], 
http://www.nsc.org/NewsDocuments/2017/12-month-estimates.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7JH9-RUUZ].  
 25. By one measure, “[t]he estimated cost of motor-vehicle deaths, injuries, and 
property damage in 2016 was $432.5 billion, an increase of 12% from 2015.  The costs 
include wage and productivity losses, medical expenses, administrative expenses, 
employer costs, and property damage.” NSC FATALITY ESTIMATES, supra note 24.  
By another measure, the cost has been estimated to be more than $800 billion. See 
Issues, ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY & AUTO SAFETY, http://saferoads.org/issues 
[https://perma.cc/2BDA-9ST9]. 
 26. See Philip Caulfield, Gun Deaths to Surpass Deaths in Traffic Accidents by 
2015:  Report, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 19, 2012, 5:37 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/gun-deaths-outpace-traffic-deaths-2015-
report-article-1.1223721 [https://perma.cc/L8M8-3Q4M] (citing the CDC). 
 27. 10 Leading Causes of Injury Deaths by Age Group Highlighting 
Unintentional Injury Deaths, United States–2010, OFF. OF STAT. & PROGRAMMING, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/injury/
wisqars/pdf/10LCID_Unintentional_Deaths_2010-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3C3-
TCDU]. 
 28. See generally Archives of Statistical Summaries, supra note 16. 
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traumatic brain injuries, and other life-altering injuries), and more 
than 618,000 have suffered less serious injuries—all of this in just one 
U.S. city.29  Regardless of the setting, U.S. roads and streets pose a 
high risk of death and injury to all road users.30 
II.  VISION ZERO:  A NEW APPROACH TO ADDRESS THE PANDEMIC 
Increasingly, policymakers on all levels of government, grassroots 
organizations, and crash victims and their families are no longer 
viewing the U.S. pandemic of traffic deaths and injuries as inevitable 
“accidents,” but instead as preventable crashes constituting a public 
health crisis.31  Cities across the United States are adopting Vision 
Zero—a policy and strategy with the goal of eliminating all traffic 
fatalities and severe injuries, while increasing safe, healthy, and 
equitable transportation and mobility modes.32  First implemented in 
                                                                                                            
 29. See id. 
 30. Compared to other countries with comparable transportation infrastructure 
and GDP per capita, U.S traffic fatalities are consistently and significantly higher.  
The population-based traffic death rate in the United States is over three times 
higher than in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden, and over twice as high as 
in France and Germany. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STATUS REPORT ON 
ROAD SAFETY 2015, 75-256 (2015), http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/
road_safety_status/2015/en [https://perma.cc/CMZ2-2G8Z].  Comparing traffic 
fatality rates by vehicle miles traveled, the differences with these countries tend to 
shrink but remain significant. See INT’L TRAFFIC SAFETY DATA & ANALYSIS GRP., 
OECD, ROAD SAFETY ANNUAL REPORT 2015 17-18 (2015), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/transport/road-safety-annual-report-2015_irtad-2015-en 
[https://perma.cc/GB6W-25ME].  United States residents are more likely to drive 
than European residents, a tendency that can be explained by lower retail gasoline 
prices in the United States and better and more accessible public transportation in 
many European countries. See Ralph Buehler, 9 Reasons the U.S. Ended Up So 
Much More Car-Dependent than Europe, CITYLAB (Feb. 4, 2014), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2014/02/9-reasons-us-ended-so-much-more-
car-dependent-europe/8226 [https://perma.cc/J6HD-G25K]. 
 31. See Daniel C. Vock, How a Brooklyn Brewmaster Helped Make New York 
City Safer for Pedestrians, GOVERNING (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.governing.com/
topics/urban/gov-vision-zero-pedestrian-deaths-brooklyn-brewery.html 
[https://perma.cc/VS49-CE6D]. 
 32. Vision Zero strategies differ somewhat between countries and between cities, 
states, and federal governments.  For example, Sweden does not have a timeframe 
within which to achieve zero deaths. See ARNE KARYD, SWEDEN’S VISION ZERO:  
THE LEAST MOURNED TRAFFIC CASUALTY (2001), http://www.kawi.se/visionzero.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SB8S-BTRF].  By contrast, NYC has set a timeframe to achieve 
zero traffic fatalities and serious injuries by 2024. See David Meyer, Taking Stock of 
Vision Zero Three Years In, STREETSBLOG NYC (Feb. 23, 2017), 
http://nyc.streetsblog.org/2017/02/23/taking-stock-of-vision-zero-three-years-in 
[https://perma.cc/KPD3-NE7Y]; see also VISION ZERO ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 
7.  The U.S. Department of Transportation’s “Road to Zero” strategy has a 
timeframe of thirty years but only for traffic fatalities, not serious injuries. See U.S. 
DOT, National Safety Council Launch Road to Zero Coalition to End Roadway 
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Sweden in the 1990s, Vision Zero is now being applied in several U.S. 
cities, including Austin, Chicago, Fort Lauderdale, New York City, 
Portland (Oregon), San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.33  
Each city’s Vision Zero plan sets a year by which traffic deaths and 
serious injuries must be eliminated.34  In 2016, the U.S. federal 
government announced its own Vision Zero-inspired “Road to Zero” 
program, declaring a goal of reaching zero traffic deaths nationwide 
within thirty years.35 
A. What Is Vision Zero? 
Vision Zero differs from past traffic safety efforts that have focused 
on achieving moderate year-over-year reductions in injuries and 
fatalities and have applied certain measures—often referred to as the 
three “E’s:” engineering, which includes road infrastructure designs 
and technical changes;36 education, typically driver awareness and 
training;37 and enforcement, typically police traffic enforcement.38  
Vision Zero adds several critical new elements:  first, the program 
                                                                                                            
Fatalities, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter National Safety Council 
Launch Road to Zero Coalition], https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-
dot-national-safety-council-launch-road-zero-coalition-end-roadway-fatalities 
[https://perma.cc/4KPA-36M3]. 
 33. See National Safety Council Launch Road to Zero Coalition, supra note 32; 
Angie Schmitt, 10 Cities Chosen to Help Model Vision Zero Policy in the U.S., 
STREETSBLOG USA (Jan. 27, 2016), http://usa.streetsblog.org/2016/01/27/10-cities-
chosen-to-help-model-vision-zero-policy-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/F3D2-ZU7E]. 
 34. See Schmitt, supra note 33. See generally Vision Zero Cities Map, VISION 
ZERO NETWORK, http://visionzeronetwork.org/resources/vision-zero-cities 
[https://perma.cc/5QD7-LE49] (last updated Mar. 2017). 
 35. National Safety Council Launch Road to Zero Coalition, supra note 32. 
 36. Engineering measures include expanded pedestrian curb space, protected bike 
lanes, speed restrictions, simplified vehicle movements including left-turn restrictions, 
traffic signals with leading pedestrian intervals that eliminate turning conflicts 
between vulnerable road users and motor vehicles, pedestrian islands, narrower road 
lanes, speed bumps, wide sidewalks, mid-block cross-walks, high visibility painted 
crosswalks, “daylighting” treatments that remove parking at and near street corners 
to ensure that motorists can have a clean line of sight and can see pedestrians as they 
are turning, as well as motor vehicle features, including airbags, collision detection 
warnings, and more. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, URBAN STREET 
DESIGN GUIDE (2013), http://nacto.org/publication/urban-street-design-guide 
[https://perma.cc/CUT6-V24Z]; Transp. Alternatives, The Vision Zero Street Design 
Standard, VISION ZERO STREETS, https://www.visionzerostreets.org [https://perma.cc/
LR5W-3J89]; Nicole Schneider, Executive Director, Walk San Francisco, Vision 
Zero and the Three E’s:  Engineering, Enforcement, Education, Designing Cities 
Conference:  San Francisco 2014 (Oct. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Vision Zero and the 
Three E’s], http://nacto.org/event/designing-cities-2014-vision-zero-and-the-three-es-
engineering-enforcement-education [https://perma.cc/6PS7-75WK]. 
 37. See Vision Zero and the Three E’s, supra note 36. 
 38. See id. 
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includes a goal of zero as the only acceptable number for traffic 
fatalities and serious injuries, compared to a modest year-by-year 
percentage reduction.  Second, Vision Zero creates urgency and 
measurable accountability by setting a date by which to achieve the 
goal of zero.  Measures applied by policymakers as part of Vision 
Zero tend to include redesigning streets, lowering speed limits, 
implementing impactful behavior change campaigns, and enhancing 
data-driven traffic enforcement.39  Third, Vision Zero also 
incorporates a multidisciplinary approach, bringing together diverse 
stakeholders and government agencies to address the many causes of 
traffic crashes, including local transportation departments, police, 
prosecutors, public health departments, municipal vehicle fleet 
management, and, as has become unique to U.S. Vision Zero efforts, 
non-government actors including advocacy organizations, traffic 
victims, and their families—who are often the ones advocating for 
government adoption of Vision Zero.40 
Finally, Vision Zero marks a shift in transportation planning 
priorities.  Transportation planning over the past sixty years has 
prioritized what is known as “level of service,” a term traditionally 
used by engineers and transportation planners to indicate how many 
motor vehicles could be moved through a given stretch of road.41  The 
more vehicles a stretch of road could accommodate per hour, the 
greater the level of service.42  One way greater levels of service were 
achieved was by increasing vehicle travel speeds, including raising 
speed limits and adding and widening road lanes.43  However, more 
vehicles traveling at higher speeds on wider roads lead to significantly 
more dangerous and lethal road conditions for all road users, 
including motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians.44  Wider roads and 
                                                                                                            
 39. What is Vision Zero?, VISION ZERO NETWORK, http://visionzeronetwork.org/
about/what-is-vision-zero [https://perma.cc/PWL7-6TWA]. 
 40. Founded in 2014 in New York City, the group Families for Safe Streets 
consists of individuals who have either lost someone to traffic violence or have been 
injured themselves.  The group advocates for safer streets and provides a peer 
support network and resources for others with similar experiences. See generally 
Families for Safe Streets, TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES, https://www.transalt.org/get
involved/familiesforsafestreets [https://perma.cc/WU5P-4J7F].  Similar groups using 
similar names have since been established in several other cities in North America. 
 41. See Joe Linton, Report:  “Multi-Modal Level of Service” Metrics Not Quite 
Up to the Challenge, STREETSBLOG LA (Oct. 17, 2014), http://la.streetsblog.org/
2014/10/17/report-multi-modal-level-of-service-metrics-not-quite-up-to-the-challenge 
[https://perma.cc/Y39P-UCL3]. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Lane Width, in URBAN STREET DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 36. 
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travel lanes also mean greater crossing distances for pedestrians, thus 
increasing their risk of exposure to lethal vehicles.45  Further, the 
average motor vehicle traveling at twenty miles per hour has a 
stopping distance of forty feet, and a pedestrian’s risk of death when 
struck is five percent.46  By comparison, a vehicle travelling at forty 
miles per hour has a stopping distance of 118 feet, and the risk of 
pedestrian death jumps to eighty-five percent.47  And starting at fifty 
miles per hour the risk of death upon impact is considered to be 
nearly one hundred percent.48  Transportation planners and policy 
makers throughout the country continue to prioritize high vehicle 
speeds in an effort to increase the level of service, but do so at the 
expense of human lives.  High vehicle speeds are a significant reason 
why tens of thousands continue to die in U.S. traffic every year.49  In 
contrast to traditional traffic planning, Vision Zero seeks to prioritize 
safety for all road users over the movement of vehicles and high 
vehicle speeds, by implementing and enforcing lower speed limits, 
narrowing road lanes to discourage speeding, and implementing 
physical objects and traffic signaling to reduce dangerous turning 
behavior by motorists, among several other measures.50  In NYC, 
police have significantly increased enforcement of certain Vision 
Zero violations, principally speeding and failure to yield to a 
pedestrian.51 
The additional measures that set the era of Vision Zero policies 
apart from prior eras are often summarized as the two new E’s, 
evaluation and equity,52 in addition to the traditional three E’s of 
engineering, education, and enforcement.  These new E’s have 
                                                                                                            
 45. See Dewan Masud Karim, Narrower Lanes, Safer Streets, RESEARCHGATE 
(2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277590178_Narrower_Lanes_Safer_
Streets [https://perma.cc/ZZ44-KMXH]. 
 46. See Design Speed, in URBAN STREET DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 36. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY 
PREVENTION 77-78 (Margie Peden et al. eds. 2004), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
10665/42871/1/9241562609.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2AH-V3H9]. 
 49. See Safety on the Road, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, http://www.nsc.org/learn/
pages/nsc-on-the-road.aspx [https://perma.cc/X3QB-RAZZ]. 
 50. See What is Vision Zero?, supra note 39.  For several other measures, outside 
the scope of this Article, used to address dangerous driving and traffic fatalities in the 
United States, see 2016 Fatality Estimates, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, 
http://www.nsc.org/learn/NSC-Initiatives/Pages/Fatality-Estimates.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/GKU7-HLR8]. 
 51. VISION ZERO:  YEAR THREE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38. 
 52. See CITY OF L.A., VISION ZERO LOS ANGELES:  THE FACTS, http://visionzero.
lacity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/LA_VisionZero_FactSheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/76CH-M6X5]. 
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become core tenets in many Vision Zero policies and are often 
deemed necessary to reach zero.53  Evaluation is necessary to 
establish accountability for the progress made—or lack thereof—on 
the measures needed to reach the goal of zero; while achieving equity 
is necessary to maintain the support for those measures by 
stakeholders and to allocate resources to the locations and population 
groups disproportionately affected by traffic violence, primarily Black 
and Hispanic and lower-income populations, in order to rectify 
historical inequities and higher rates of injuries and fatalities among 
those groups.54 
B. Equity in Vision Zero 
Equity in Vision Zero is the fair and just implementation of 
transportation safety measures across all populations, including race, 
age, gender, geography, and socio-economic status, and involves 
engineering, education, and enforcement measures, considering both 
past and current inequities.55  Where inequities exist, so do the 
greatest and most disproportionate rates of traffic deaths and injuries.  
For example, in U.S. cities, eighty-nine percent of high-income 
communities have sidewalks, while only forty-nine percent of low-
income communities do.56  At the same time, African-Americans, 
Native Americans, and Hispanic Americans, who live in low-income 
communities at higher rates than White Americans, are at least twice 
as likely to be killed while walking.57  These deaths are not 
“accidents” but the foreseeable result of inadequate and inequitable 
engineering and transportation policy decisions.58  Inequities are also 
prevalent within traffic enforcement, particularly in the form of racial 
                                                                                                            
 53. Marco Conner, Racial Inequity in Traffic Enforcement, VISION ZERO CITIES:  
INT’L J. TRAFFIC SAFETY INNOVATION, at 12, 14 (Mar. 2016), http://www.visionzero
cities.org/journal/dl/Vision_Zero_Cities_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DJX-86EP]. 
 54. See Mike Maciag, Pedestrians Dying at Disproportionate Rates in America’s 
Poorer Neighborhoods, GOVERNING (Aug. 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/
public-justice-safety/gov-pedestrian-deaths-analysis.html [https://perma.cc/DF6V-
VDQQ]. 
 55. See, e.g., SARA ZIMMERMAN ET AL., SAFE ROUTES TO SCH. NAT’L P’SHIP, AT 
THE INTERSECTION OF ACTIVE TRANSPORTATION AND EQUITY 14-21 (2015), 
http://www.saferoutespartnership.org/sites/default/files/pdf/At-the-Intersection-of-
Active-Transportation-and-Equity.pdf [https://perma.cc/K77M-G6JJ] (providing an 
in-depth discussion on the vast number of transportation inequities faced by low-
income people and people of color). 
 56. Maciag, supra note 54. 
 57. See Angie Schmitt, The Inequitable Toll of Pedestrian Deaths, STREETSBLOG 
USA (May 7, 2013), http://usa.streetsblog.org/2013/05/07/the-inequitable-toll-of-
pedestrian-deaths [https://perma.cc/J66M-K9YK]. 
 58. See Maciag, supra note 54. 
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disparities in who is stopped, searched, and ticketed.59  Additionally, 
several studies have shown that drivers are significantly less likely to 
stop for African-American and Hispanic adult pedestrians solely 
because of the pedestrians’ race, thereby suggesting deep implicit 
racial biases.60  Increasingly, Vision Zero stakeholders are recognizing 
that addressing these inequities is a just and moral requirement that is 
also necessary to achieve Vision Zero.61 
III.  RACIAL DISPARITIES IN POLICE TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT 
To provide a basis for exploring the extent of racial inequities and 
disparities in U.S. police traffic enforcement, it is necessary to 
examine the different types of enforcement and ways that police 
interact with drivers and other road users. 
A. Understanding Police Traffic Enforcement 
Police traffic enforcement can be categorized into three major 
categories:  traffic injury responses, traffic safety violations, and 
discretionary traffic stops.62  Additionally, there are two broadly 
defined stages to all enforcement:  first, the initial police response up 
to, but not including, arrest or ticketing of the driver (the first 
enforcement stage), and second, from the decision to arrest or ticket 
the driver, including subsequent prosecution, adjudication, and 
penalty imposition (the second enforcement stage). 
1. Traffic Injury Responses 
In traffic injury responses, a victim has been harmed, frequently by 
a driver who made a dangerous driving choice, and police have 
                                                                                                            
 59. See infra Part III. 
 60. See, e.g., Courtney Coughenour et al., Examining Racial Bias as a Potential 
Factor in Pedestrian Crashes, 98 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 96, 96-100 
(2017), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S000145751630361X 
[https://perma.cc/PDX6-9W62] (examining the potential for racial bias in driver 
yielding behaviors at midblock crosswalks in low and high income neighborhoods 
located in Las Vegas, Nevada); OTREC, Study Examines Racial Bias at Crosswalks, 
PORTLAND ST. U. (May 19, 2014), https://www.pdx.edu/clas/news/study-examines-
racial-bias-crosswalks [https://perma.cc/G859-4WWG] (examining recent findings 
that “black pedestrians were passed by twice as many cars and waited nearly a third 
longer to cross than white pedestrians”); see also Schmitt, supra note 57 (providing 
more information about racial bias and traffic crash disparities based on age, gender, 
and race). 
 61. See Laura Bliss, Vision Zero’s Troubling Blind Spot, CITYLAB (Sept. 1, 2016), 
http://www.citylab.com/commute/2016/09/black-lives-matter-and-vision-zero/497495 
[https://perma.cc/553R-YLMX]. 
 62. See CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER:  HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE 
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 59 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2014) (distinguishing traffic-safety 
and investigatory stops). 
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responded by pursuing a crash investigation and possible ticketing 
and arrest.  Because the police-response is precipitated by a crash 
typically not witnessed by the police, racial bias by police is highly 
unlikely to occur initially; indeed there is little, if any, evidence of 
racial disparities within the first enforcement stage of traffic injury 
crash responses.63  However, bias may occur in the second 
enforcement stage when drivers are subject to criminal misdemeanor 
and felony charges, as Black and Hispanic people are far more likely 
to be arrested and receive less favorable plea offers and harsher 
punishments than similarly situated White people.64  Black and 
Hispanic people are also subjected to use of force by police at higher 
rates, even after controlling for other extralegal and legal 
characteristics such as income, education, and prior offenses.65  
Research that isolates traffic-related policing is needed to determine 
the extent and nature of racial disparities specifically in the second 
enforcement stage of traffic injury responses. 
2. Traffic Safety Violations 
Traffic safety violations are driving-offenses that are clearly 
defined and inherently dangerous, like texting while driving, 
speeding, drunk driving, and failing to yield to a vulnerable road user.  
For drivers caught committing traffic safety violations, there is little 
racial disparity in ticketing by police.  Because such violations and 
their penalties are clearly defined, there is little room for subjectivity, 
giving police officers less discretion.  Indeed, “the driver’s race (and 
gender) has no relevance to the likelihood of being stopped” for a 
traffic safety violation; rather, it is driving behavior that determines 
police enforcement of most traffic-safety laws with clear connections 
to dangerous driving.66  However, as with traffic injury responses, new 
research is needed to assess whether racial disparities exist specifically 
in the second enforcement stage of traffic safety violations, where 
drivers have been ticketed and may dispute their charge, and in other 
                                                                                                            
 63. As of March 2017, the author identified no research confirming racial 
disparities within the first enforcement stage of traffic injury responses by police in 
the United States. 
 64. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 18, at 3; see also DAVID A. HARRIS, 
ACLU, DRIVING WHILE BLACK:  RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS 
(1999), https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-
highways [https://perma.cc/8K4C-CTYT] (“Today, blacks constitute [just] 13 percent 
of the country’s drug users; [but] 37 percent of those arrested on drug charges; 55 
percent of those convicted; and 74 percent of all drug offenders sentenced to 
prison.”). 
 65. See Engel & Calnon, supra note 9. 
 66. See EPP ET AL., supra note 62, at 72. 
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ways engage with courts and administrative agencies in the 
adjudication of their alleged offense. 
3. Discretionary Traffic Stops 
In contrast to traffic safety violations and traffic injury responses, 
discretionary, or investigatory, traffic stops exhibit widespread racial 
disparities.  Discretionary stops are typically police stops for relatively 
minor violations like driving too slowly or failing to signal a vehicle’s 
turn, or for when drivers fit a certain profile or otherwise raise the 
suspicion of a police officer.  They differ from stops for traffic safety 
violations by the high level of subjectivity and discretion police 
officers have in deciding whether, and how, to carry out a stop.  
“[V]irtually all of the wide racial disparity in [police traffic 
enforcement] is concentrated in one category of stops:  discretionary 
stops for minor violations of the law.”67  Several studies show that 
Black drivers in the United States are more likely than White drivers 
to be searched during stops, even though those Black drivers are less 
likely to possess contraband,68 and account for a “disproportionate 
share of traffic-stop deaths,” often instigated using racially based 
pretexts.69  One study found that Black men aged fifty or older are as 
likely as twenty-five-year-old White men to be stopped for a minor 
offense and investigated while driving, despite a much lower 
likelihood of criminal activity.70  These disparities and police practices 
have been documented for several decades,71 and in numerous cases 
                                                                                                            
 67. Id. 
 68. See LaFraniere & Lehren, supra note 8; Kia Makarechi, What the Data 
Really Says About Police and Racial Bias, VANITY FAIR (July 14, 2016, 3:09 PM), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/07/data-police-racial-bias 
[https://perma.cc/V5ZD-FC8A] (“In San Francisco, ‘although Black people 
accounted for less than 15 percent of all stops in 2015, they accounted for over 42 
percent of all non-consent searches following stops.’  This proved unwarranted:  ‘Of 
all people searched without consent, Black and Hispanic people had the lowest ‘hit 
rates’ (i.e., the lowest rate of contraband recovered).’  In 2015, whites searched 
without consent were found to be carrying contraband at nearly two times the rate as 
blacks who were searched without consent.”). 
 69. See Wesley Lowery, A Disproportionate Number of Black Victims in Fatal 




 70. See EPP ET AL., supra note 62, at 67. 
 71. See, e.g., id. at 155 (finding that Black drivers in Chicago were 270 percent 
more likely than White drivers to be subjected to an investigatory stop). See 
generally Kathleen M. O’Day, Comment, Pretextual Traffic Stops:  Protecting Our 
Streets or Racist Police Tactics?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313 (1998) (discussing 
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such discretionary traffic stops by police turn deadly for the driver.  In 
April of 2015, Walter Scott, age fifty, was shot in the back in North 
Charleston, South Carolina, after being stopped by a police officer for 
a broken taillight.72  Three months later, Samuel DuBose, age forty-
three, was shot in the head after being stopped in Cincinnati, Ohio, 
for lacking a front license plate on his car.73  And in July of 2016, 
Philando Castile was shot and killed by a police officer near St. Paul, 
Minnesota, with his girlfriend and her four year old daughter in the 
car, while allegedly reaching for identification.74  According to police 
radio transcripts, the officer stopped Mr. Castile because he believed 
Mr. Castile looked like a suspect in a robbery due to his “wide-set 
nose.”75  All three victims were African-American. 
The shooting deaths of Walter Scott, Samuel DuBose, and 
Philando Castile represent the most tragic outcomes of discretionary 
traffic stops.  But even when traffic stops do not turn fatal, their 
consequences are widespread and long lasting.  Discretionary traffic 
stops mimic stop-and-frisk tactics common in major U.S. cities, and 
are part of a policy of so-called “quality of life” or “broken windows” 
policing, where minor offenses are targeted under the theory that this 
prevents major crimes.76  Such traffic stops have become known as 
“broken taillight policing,” where a violation relatively insignificant to 
safety is aggressively and subjectively enforced.77  These practices 
contribute significantly to the disparate stops of African-American 
                                                                                                            
pretextual stops based on race and instances where police practices have been 
documented as discriminatory). 
 72. See Mark Berman, South Carolina Police Officer in Walter Scott Shooting 
Indicted on Murder Charge, WASH. POST (June 8, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/06/08/police-officer-who-shot-walter-scott-
indicted-for-murder [https://perma.cc/BTP9-H6QJ]. 
 73. See Tana Weingartner, Campus Cop on Trial for Shooting Death During 
Routine Traffic Stop, NPR (Oct. 25, 2016, 4:37 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/25
/499224917/campus-cop-on-trial-for-shooting-death-during-routine-traffic-stop 
[https://perma.cc/ME5Z-JWPU]. 
 74. Andy Mannix, Police Audio:  Officer Stopped Philando Castile on Robbery 
Suspicion, STAR TRIB. (July 12, 2016, 7:55 PM), http://www.startribune.com/police-
audio-officer-stopped-philando-castile-on-robbery-suspicion/386344001 
[https://perma.cc/8XZ7-YU7H]. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Nick Pinto, NYPD Watchdog Shatters Bratton’s ‘Broken Windows’–Now 
What?, VILLAGE VOICE (June 28, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://www.villagevoice.com/
news/nypd-watchdog-shatters-brattons-broken-windows-now-what-8796746 
[https://perma.cc/A5PD-G87L]. 
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pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists.  In Tampa, Florida, almost 
eighty percent of bicycle-related tickets issued by police during a 
three-year period were to African-Americans, even though African-
Americans made up only twenty-five percent of the population.78  
Similar disparities in enforcement against bicyclists exist throughout 
New York City.79  
Despite significant racially disparate results, our courts have 
explicitly validated some of the practices that cause the disparities.  In 
the 1996 case Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court decided the 
constitutionality of pretextual traffic stops, where police stop and 
search vehicles based on actual or alleged minor traffic infractions.80  
The Court held that “any traffic offense committed by a driver was a 
legitimate legal basis for a stop, regardless of the officer’s subjective 
state of mind.”81  The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) was 
highly critical of the ruling and stated that: 
 In practice, the Whren decision has given the police virtually 
unlimited authority to stop and search any vehicle they want.  Every 
driver probably violates some provision of the vehicle code at some 
time during even a short drive, because state traffic codes identify so 
many different infractions.  For example, traffic codes define 
precisely how long a driver must signal before turning . . . . Vehicle 
equipment is also highly regulated.  A small light bulb must 
illuminate the rear license plate.  Tail lights must be visible from a 
particular distance . . . . And all equipment must be in working order 
at all times.  If the police target a driver for a stop and search, all 
they have to do to come up with a pretext for a stop is follow the car 
until the driver makes an inconsequential error or until a technical 
violation is observed.82 
                                                                                                            
 78. See Alexandra Zayas & Kameel Stanley, How Riding Your Bike Can Land 




 79. See Harry Levine & Loren Siegel, The Marijuana Arrest Research Project, 
Presentation at CUNY School of Law Event, Summons:  The Next Stop and Frisk 
(Apr. 24, 2014), http://marijuana-arrests.com/docs/Criminal-Court-Summonses-in-
NYC--CUNY-Law-School-April-24-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MFF-SFLE].  In 
New York City, between 2008 and 2011, an estimated twelve of the fifteen 
neighborhoods with the most summonses for riding on the sidewalk were 
predominantly Hispanic or African-American, while fourteen of the fifteen with the 
fewest were primarily White. Id. 
 80. 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996). 
 81. See HARRIS, supra note 64. 
 82. Id. 
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Still, despite the Court’s validation of pretextual stops, many police 
practices related to discretionary stops have been found to violate the 
First Amendment (including police action punishing people for 
“talking back to officers” and “recording public police activities” in 
connection with stops), the Fourth Amendment (including police 
using excessive force, stopping and detaining people without 
reasonable suspicion, or arresting people without probable cause, in 
other words, failing to legally perform so-called Terry stops),83 and 
the Fourteenth Amendment (including police exhibiting racial bias in 
stops).84  Moreover, widespread use of discretionary stops and broken 
taillight policing by police has no proven traffic safety benefit.85  It 
likely does nothing to deter dangerous driving or reduce the carnage 
of traffic fatalities and injuries on U.S. roads.  The ACLU argues that, 
for the related policing practice of stop-question-and-frisk, “[n]o 
research has ever proven the effectiveness of New York City’s stop-
and-frisk regime, and the small number of arrests, summonses, and 
guns recovered demonstrates that the practice is ineffective.”86  The 
ALCU goes on to argue that crime data also does not support the 
claim that the practice has made New York City safer:  “While violent 
crimes fell 29 percent in New York City from 2001 to 2010, other 
large cities experienced larger violent crime declines without relying 
on stop and frisk abuses:  59 percent in Los Angeles, 56 percent in 
New Orleans, 49 percent in Dallas, and 37 percent in Baltimore.”87 
The results of these discretionary and investigatory stops are the 
disparate stopping, ticketing, and arresting of African-American 
drivers, bicyclists, and pedestrians, which “erode individual liberty, 
undermine democratic equality, and divide local communities by 
                                                                                                            
 83. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (describing the Court’s 
framework for assessing the constitutionality of investigatory stops). See generally 
Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). 
 84. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 16, 24, 63 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV48-7ZU5] (finding violations of the First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments by the Ferguson, Mo. Police Department). 
 85. See infra Section IV.B. 
 86. Stop-and-Frisk Myth Busters, NYCLU (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.nyclu.org/
sites/default/files/Mythbusters_08.30.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6L5-XEMC].  For a 
detailed analysis of broken taillight policing, see HARRIS, supra note 64. 
 87. See Stop-and-Frisk Myth Busters, supra note 86.  For additional information 
showing the lack of crime-reduction from stop-and-frisk practices, see Michael P. 
Venutra et al., Donald Trump Touted the Merits of Stop-and-Frisk. Here Are the 
Facts, DNAINFO (Nov. 3, 2016, 4:59 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-
york/20160927/east-harlem/donald-trump-stop-and-frisk-hillary-clinton-unconstitu
tional-donald-trump-presidential-debate-nypd [https://perma.cc/82U9-92XC]. 
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income, race, and ethnicity.”88  Discretionary stops, where a police 
officer decides to stop a driver based on physical characteristics like a 
“wide-set nose”,89 or because a person is bicycling in a predominantly 
African-American neighborhood, contribute to what is known as 
race-making practices.90  These practices reinforce racist stereotypes 
about who is likely to engage in illegal activity, and signal to Black 
residents that they should stay away from certain predominantly 
White and higher-income neighborhoods.  Broken taillight policing 
criminalizes non-violent and non-criminal behavior, and has the 
perverse effect of making drivers feel less safe and, far too often, ends 
an individual’s life instead of saving a life. 
From a public traffic safety perspective, the consequences of 
widespread discretionary traffic stops are that enforcement resources 
are spent on unwarranted stops, vehicle searches, and arrests, which 
do little, if anything, to deter dangerous driving, and leave fewer 
resources to respond effectively to traffic crashes involving injuries 
and to perform traffic safety violation stops for more serious 
dangerous driving offenses like drunk driving, speeding, failing to use 
due care, failure to yield, and texting while driving.  These offenses 
are chronically under-enforced91 and result in the deaths and injuries 
of thousands every month across the United States.92  They are also 
the most prevalent factors among the group of driver actions that, 
when combined, contribute to ninety-four percent of U.S. crashes.93 
                                                                                                            
 88. EPP ET AL., supra note 62, at 159. 
 89. The police officer who stopped and eventually shot Philando Castile described 
Mr. Castile’s “wide-set nose” as looking like that of a robbery suspect. Mannix, supra 
note 74. 
 90. See, e.g., Raygine DiAquoi, Dir. of the Office of Diversity Culture & 
Inclusion & Assistant Professor of Clinical Sociomedical Scis., Mailman Sch. of Pub. 
Health, Address at the Columbia University Food for Thought Seminar, Symbols in 
the Strangefruit Seeds:  What the Talk Black Parents Have with Their Sons Tells Us 
About Racism (Oct. 5, 2016), https://livestream.com/mailman/events/6428228 
[https://perma.cc/CB98-4JQQ]. 
 91. For under-enforcement of texting while driving, see Editorial, Adults Need to 
Turn off the Phone While Driving, DAY (June 22, 2010, 5:42 AM), 
http://www.theday.com/article/20100622/OP01/306229963 [https://perma.cc/K8UR-
A3NJ].  For under-enforcement of alcohol-impaired driving, see LAURENCE H. ROSS, 
CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING:  SOCIAL POLICY FOR SAVING LIVES (1994), and 
Laurence H. Ross, Social Control Through Deterrence:  Drinking-and-Driving Laws, 
10 ANN. REV. SOC. 21 (1984) [hereinafter Social Control Through Deterrence].  For 
under-enforcement of other vehicular offenses, see TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES, JUSTICE 
DENIED:  NEW YORK CITY’S DISTRICT ATTORNEYS PLEAD OUT OF VISION ZERO 11 
(2015), https://www.transalt.org/sites/default/files/news/reports/2015/Justice_Denied_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PCF-KX2U]. 
 92. See supra Part I. 
 93. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, supra note 5. 
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The inefficiencies and racial disparities in current traffic 
enforcement practices require a new approach.  In order to achieve 
the Vision Zero goal of eliminating traffic fatalities and serious 
injuries, traffic enforcement must focus solely on responding 
efficiently to all injurious and fatal traffic crashes and on the traffic 
safety violations that cause the most physical harm. 
IV.  DETERRENCE AND DANGEROUS DRIVING 
A. Mothers Against Drunk Driving:  Inspiration for Effective 
Enforcement 
Despite the deep inequities that result from certain police 
enforcement, traffic enforcement can, when used appropriately, 
contribute significantly to the cultural change necessary to reduce 
dangerous driving behavior, traffic fatalities, and injuries.  The effort 
in the United States to eliminate drunk and alcohol impaired driving 
provides a useful example.  Since the early 1980s, the annual number 
of drunk driving deaths in the United States has decreased from 
approximately 25,000 to nearly 10,000 in 2013.94  This is attributed to 
increased frequency and certainty of apprehension for drunk driving 
and the public perception of increased risk of apprehension.  It 
involved new legal sanctions, a lower maximum blood alcohol content 
allowed, high visibility enforcement such as sobriety checkpoints, 
repeated declarations by police and prosecutors that drunk driving 
was not tolerated, public awareness campaigns, and victims-based 
advocacy.95  The cultural change was led by the group Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving (“MADD”), born out of tragedy after 
founder Candace Lightner’s thirteen year old daughter, Cari, was 
                                                                                                            
 94. Compare NAT’L CTR. FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1993:  ALCOHOL (1993), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/
Api/Public/ViewPublication/93F1 [https://perma.cc/9CVP-3365], with NAT’L CTR. 
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 95. See infra Section IV.B.  In addition to these measures, MADD has called for 
the following measures to end alcohol impaired driving, which contributes to 
approximately twenty-five percent of U.S. traffic fatalities:  in-car breathalyzers for 
all drunk drivers to prove they are sober before their car will start; mandatory blood 
alcohol testing for death and serious injury crashes; open container restrictions in 
vehicles; enforcement of underage drinking laws; and development of a nationwide 
legal limit of .08 blood alcohol content while operating a motor vehicle. See MADD’s 
Campaign, MADD, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/campaign [https://perma.cc/
RS54-U7Z4?type=image].  
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killed by a drunk driver.96  Formed in 1980, MADD helped make 
drunk driving socially unacceptable.  The cultural change was also 
facilitated by several different level government entities across the 
United States that became involved and made repeated public 
admonishments against drunk driving.97  Despite criticism by some 
that MADD increasingly focused on excessively punitive penalties,98 
the efforts to eliminate drunk driving, still led by MADD today, and 
the remarkable reduction in drunk driving deaths since the 1980s can 
provide insight into how enforcement measures can deter other types 
of dangerous driving. 
A 2016 survey by the National Safety Council showed that 
“[a]lthough 83% of drivers surveyed believe driving is a safety 
concern, a startling number say they are comfortable speeding (64%) 
[and] texting either manually or through voice controls (47%),” 
whereas far fewer (10%) say they are comfortable driving after they 
feel they’ve had too much alcohol.99  This indicates that, while drunk 
driving has become socially unacceptable, most other forms of 
dangerous driving have not. 
B. Understanding Deterrence 
To understand the factors that have contributed to the reduction of 
drunk driving-related deaths by over fifty percent since 1980,100 and 
how they may be augmented and applied to other types of dangerous 
driving, this Section will examine deterrence theory and the factors 
known to create both individual and general public deterrence of 
harmful and illegal acts. 
Deterrence can be understood as the threat or expectation of 
undesirable consequences discouraging individuals from certain 
behavior.101  Such consequences range from a civil monetary fine, to 
                                                                                                            
 96. See May 03 1980:  MADD Founder’s Daughter Killed by Drunk Driver, 
HISTORY.COM (May 3, 2009), http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/madd-
founders-daughter-killed-by-drunk-driver [https://perma.cc/7BGV-FJYM]. 
 97. See, e.g., Drunk Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drunk-driving [https://perma.cc/66V7-AJSW]; 
Safety Report on Eliminating Impaired Driving–Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L 
TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD (May 14, 2013), https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/
2013_Impaired_Driving_BMG-FAQs.aspx [https://perma.cc/E6VM-N5MX]. 
 98. See, e.g., MADD Struggles to Remain Relevant, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2002), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/aug/6/20020806-035702-2222r 
[https://perma.cc/NYQ3-UGBB]. 
 99. 2016 Fatality Estimates, supra note 50. 
 100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 101. See Deterrence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/deterrence [https://perma.cc/S6V5-43KY]. 
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incarceration, to points on your driver’s license and to being viewed 
negatively by other people—particularly family and friends. 
1. Initial vs. Residual Deterrence and Specific vs. General 
Deterrence 
When assessing the efficacy of deterrence measures, we distinguish 
between initial and residual deterrence, and between specific and 
general deterrence.  Initial deterrence is achieved when the threat of 
legal consequences temporarily discourages potential offenders from 
an illegal act, while residual deterrence is achieved when such threat 
discourages potential illegal acts over a longer period of time.102  
Specific deterrence, also known as individual deterrence, is when the 
threat of future legal consequences discourages an individual, who 
has already experienced legal or other forms of undesired 
consequences, from re-committing a particular act, in other words, 
from re-offending; by contrast, general deterrence is achieved when 
the threat of mainly legal consequences discourages numerous 
individuals who have never experienced such consequences, typically 
the general public, from committing an offense.103  The least effective 
deterrent outcome is when a policy measure achieves only initial 
specific deterrence—impacting a single person for a short period of 
time—and the optimal outcome is achieving residual general 
deterrence where the general public is disincentivized for a longer 
period of time from committing a harmful act.104 
2. Perceptions of Likely Apprehension and Legal Consequences 
According to basic deterrence theory, individuals are more likely 
to be deterred when legal or other negative consequences are likely, 
administered swiftly after an illegal act, and severe enough to 
outweigh the rewards of that illegal act; individuals are less likely to 
be deterred when legal consequences are unlikely, remote in time, 
and their severity is tolerable by that person.105  However, individuals 
sometimes act irrationally, impulsively, and emotionally,106 have 
                                                                                                            
 102. See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Crackdowns:  Initial and 
Residual Deterrence, 12 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2-3 (1990). 
 103. See Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and 
Specific Deterrence, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 123, 123 (1993). 
 104. See Sherman, supra note 102. 
 105. See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence:  A Review of the Evidence by a 
Criminologist for Economists, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 83, 85 (2013). 
 106. See Alex R. Piquero et al., Elaborating the Individual Difference Component 
in Deterrence Theory, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 335, 335, 356 (2011) (providing a 
more context-based analysis of the rational choice model with regards to deterrence). 
990 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
different moral inhibitions,107 and often misjudge the actual legal 
consequences of illegal activity,108 making basic deterrence theory less 
reliable.  Ultimately, whether individuals are deterred depends not on 
the potential legal consequences, such as a fine or incarceration, but 
on their perceptions of such consequences, as well as their mental 
state at the time of an act, their moral inhibitions, and their social 
bonds.  Individuals construct their risk assessments of consequences 
based on public threat communication (e.g., public sanction 
awareness campaigns and police visibility) and on personal and 
vicarious experiences, including family and friends—which means 
individuals are heavily influenced by what is considered socially 
acceptable.109  Most importantly, empirical research shows that 
perceived “certainty of apprehension [and legal consequences], not 
the severity of the ensuing legal consequence, is the more effective 
deterrent.”110  Indeed, increased perceived certainty of apprehension 
and legal consequences has consistent general deterring effects on 
drunk driving, speeding, and running a red light,111 whereas increased 
severity of legal consequences has no reliable deterring effects.112  
Methods to achieve such perceptions may include publicized police 
checkpoints, publicized and frequent police enforcement actions, 
speed and red light cameras, and high profile public awareness 
campaigns about the consequences of dangerous driving.113 
Additionally, the fact that optimal deterrence depends primarily on 
the perceived certainty of apprehension and legal consequences “has 
important policy implications, among which are that lengthy prison 
                                                                                                            
 107. See Alex Piquero & Raymond Paternoster, An Application of Stafford and 
Warr’s Reconceptualization of Deterrence to Drinking and Driving, 35 J. RES. CRIME 
& DELINQUENCY 3, 3 (1998). 
 108. See Bill McCarthy, New Economics of Sociological Criminology, 28 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 417, 420 (2002). 
 109. See Piquero & Paternoster, supra note 107. 
 110. Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 
199, 199 (2013), http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/670398 
[https://perma.cc/W4V9-BYAF]. 
 111. See William DeJong & Ralph Hingson, Strategies to Reduce Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol, 19 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 359, 364-65 (1998); Bryan E. 
Porter et al., Turning Off the Cameras:  Red Light Running Characteristics and Rates 
After Photo Enforcement Legislation Expired, 50 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & 
PREVENTION 1104, 1110 (2013) (showing how deterrent effect of red light cameras 
that had been turned off decreased as time passed and awareness of lack of 
enforcement increased). 
 112. See Dieter Dölling et al., Is Deterrence Effective? Results of a Meta-Analysis 
of Punishment, 15 EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 201, 210-12 (2009); Nagin, supra 
note 110. 
 113. For discussion and more examples, see infra Section V.A. 
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sentences and mandatory minimum sentencing cannot be justified on 
deterrence.”114 
3. Legitimacy:  Justice as Fairness115 
In addition to perceptions of apprehension and legal consequences, 
people’s perception of a policy as just and legitimate is also critical to 
achieve optimal deterrence.  Legal consequences that the public feels 
are unjust can erode trust in the legal system and result in non-
enforcement.116  For example, the New York Police Department 
(“NYPD”) has largely ignored jaywalking in NYC for decades despite 
its near universal prevalence.  And when then Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani instructed police officers to actively enforce jaywalking, a 
statutory offense, many officers simply refused to comply, as did the 
public at large.117  Penalizing jaywalking in NYC was and is generally 
considered unjust and unfair by New Yorkers; consequently, the 
attempt to do so failed.  Perceived unjust legal consequences can also 
result in more “not guilty” pleas, more requests for jury trials, court 
backlogs, lower conviction rates, and greater strains throughout the 
criminal justice system.118 
Finally, a powerful predictor of compliance with a policy or law is 
whether such measure is viewed as legitimate.  Procedural justice, as 
shown by Professor Tracy L. Meares, is the most important indicator 
of that perceived legitimacy or illegitimacy.119  Four factors determine 
whether a police traffic stop or enforcement policy is viewed as 
procedurally just and, by extension, as fair and legitimate.  The first is 
                                                                                                            
 114. Nagin, supra note 110.  A need exists for research to determine if there is a 
minimum level of penalty, in the form of incarceration or monetary sanctions, below 
which a lesser general deterrent effect is achieved or individual re-offending 
increases, and above which any further increase has no additional deterring effect. 
 115. The Rawlsian concept of justice as fairness stipulates that every individual has 
an equal right to basic liberties, and without such fair and equal rights justice cannot 
be realized. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (original ed. 1971). 
 116. See Social Control Through Deterrence, supra note 91, at 33. 
 117. See Kit R. Roane, Police Balk at Crackdown on Jaywalkers by Giuliani, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 8, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/08/nyregion/police-balk-at-
crackdown-on-jaywalkers-by-giuliani.html [https://perma.cc/Z3GV-W6XA]. 
 118. See generally Social Control Through Deterrence, supra note 91, at 30-32. 
 119. See Tracey Meares, The Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-
American Men, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 651, 659 (2009); Tracey L. Meares, Professor, Yale 
Law Sch., Procedural Justice:  The Secret Ingredient?, Address at Community Justice 
2014 (Apr. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Procedural Justice:  The Secret Ingredient?], 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/procedural-justice-secret-ingredient-tracey-
l-meares-community-justice-2014 [https://perma.cc/6VT4-9FKP]; see also POLICE 
EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, LEGITIMACY AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:  A NEW 
ELEMENT OF POLICE LEADERSHIP (Craig Fischer ed. 2014), http://www.police
forum.org/free-online-documents [https://perma.cc/88KP-UXAJ]. 
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voice—whether affected communities have been able to play a 
formative role in the development of the policy, and whether 
individuals who are stopped have an opportunity to express to the 
officer the circumstances of their actions preceding the stop.120  The 
second is decision neutrality and fairness—whether the stop, 
ticketing, arrest, or adjudication are performed fairly and without 
bias.121  The third is respectful treatment—whether individuals 
believe they are treated with dignity and respect when stopped.122  
And the fourth is trustworthiness—whether stopped individuals 
perceive the officer or other enforcement agent as trustworthy.123  
Policing that meets these four criteria can generally be described as 
procedurally just and should be the goal of all enforcement agencies 
that seek to increase compliance with traffic safety laws and reduce 
dangerous driving.  Research shows that when individuals perceive an 
enforcement encounter and adjudication as fair and legitimate, they 
are more likely to comply and follow that law in the future, regardless 
of the outcome of their initial case or ticketing.124 
V.  ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE TRAFFIC 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE AGE OF VISION ZERO 
“Policing cannot be judged only by an absence of crime, it must be 
measured by the presence of justice.”125 
For cities and jurisdictions that have adopted Vision Zero, and for 
those who share its goals, traffic enforcement should primarily be 
devoted towards achieving the greatest long-lasting and general 
public deterrence against dangerous driving, in order to eliminate 
traffic fatalities and serious injuries.  Additionally, jurisdictions must 
recognize that unconstitutional and illegitimate policing, and racial 
disparities in discretionary traffic stops, are both morally 
unacceptable and counterproductive to deterring dangerous driving.  
Having explored lessons of police traffic enforcement and deterrence 
in Part IV of this Article, this Part will advance ways of applying such 
lessons in the traffic enforcement context and argue that these 
                                                                                                            
 120. See Procedural Justice:  The Secret Ingredient?, supra note 119. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See LAPD Chief Charlie Beck’s Testimony:  President Obama’s Task Force 
on 21st Century Policing, L.A. CMTY. POLICING, http://www.lacp.org/2015-Articles-
Main/020615-ChiefBeck-on21stCenturyPolicing.htm [https://perma.cc/5VST-49M5] 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2017). 
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methods must be the focus of Vision Zero if its goals are to be 
achieved. 
A. Achieving Effective Traffic Enforcement:  Deterrence Lessons 
Applied 
As discussed in Part IV, lengthy prison sentences and mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws are unlikely to deter dangerous driving.  
Instead, optimally effective deterrence measures must create the 
public perception that apprehension for illegal activity is likely, that 
enforcement is consistent and sustained, that legal consequences for 
criminal activity are probable, and that enforcement policy, legal 
sanctions, and interactions with enforcement agents are just, 
legitimate, and fair.  Deterrence measures must also consider the 
resources and abilities of police and other enforcement entities to 
impose legal sanctions.  Indeed, “[enforcement] should be highly 
visible, sustained and widespread.  If enforcement is not consistent 
and visible, drivers will revert to dangerous behavior.”126 
In applying these lessons, enforcement agencies should 
significantly increase high-visibility deterrence measures, including 
sobriety checkpoints to address impaired driving, high-profile 
enforcement actions against reckless driving preceded and followed 
by media campaigns, “pre-enforcement” actions such as widespread 
distribution of informational palm cards that educate drivers about 
dangerous driving choices,127 and vocal admonishment by agency 
leaders against dangerous driving, which includes using press 
conferences, public statements, and media dissemination to raise 
general public awareness of legal consequences.  These measures 
must be widespread, consistent, and sustained, which means they 
must be applied as part of routine hourly and daily traffic 
enforcement, as opposed to occasional seasonal actions, and at similar 
high levels of application by adjacent police precincts and 
jurisdictions in order to create a uniform and broad perception of 
                                                                                                            
 126. TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES, PROVEN TACTICS, BETTER ENFORCEMENT:  HOW TO 
SAVE LIVES ON NYC STREETS 11 (2013), https://www.transalt.org/sites/
default/files/news/reports/2013/Proven_Tactics,_Better_Enforcement_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9UWH-YA8P]; see also Jeremy D. Davey & James E. Freeman, 
Improving Road Safety Through Deterrence-Based Initiatives, 11 SULTAN QABOOS 
U. MED. J. 29 (2011), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3074684 
[https://perma.cc/TRD7-E9KA]. 
 127. See NYC Steps Up Pedestrian Safety Efforts, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & 
SAFETY (Oct. 28, 2016), https://ohsonline.com/articles/2016/10/28/nyc-steps-up-
pedestrian-safety-efforts.aspx [https://perma.cc/49QX-NXYR]. 
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likely apprehension for dangerous driving.128  Unarmed enforcement 
agents typically tasked with issuing only parking-related tickets, 
should be empowered to enforce non-felonious traffic safety offenses 
like speeding and failing to yield.  Automated enforcement 
technology, like speed cameras, discussed later in this Article, may be 
the most effective tool to achieve widespread and consistent traffic 
enforcement and should be applied broadly. 
To ensure these measures are legitimate and perceived as just by 
drivers and the general public, enforcement agencies should involve 
the public through public service announcements and awareness 
campaigns that explain the safety aspects of relevant measures, and 
should precede select enforcement actions with warnings, giving 
drivers the opportunity to self-adjust behavior.  To achieve optimal 
legitimacy, enforcement agencies should be highly transparent and 
share aggregate case data and enforcement procedures publicly 
online as frequently as possible.  Above all, traffic enforcement must 
be data-driven, targeting the most dangerous actions that contribute 
to the most crashes.  This means targeting offenses like speeding, 
drunk driving, failing to yield, and texting by drivers, and focusing far 
less on bicycling on the sidewalk, tinted windows, and other offenses 
relatively insignificant to traffic safety.129  It also involves severely 
reducing and possibly eliminating so-called quality-of-life and broken 
taillight enforcement.130 
For police responding to traffic injury crashes, achieving swift 
adjudication and legal consequences should be prioritized for 
                                                                                                            
 128. See TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES, DEATH, DANGER AND IGNORING THE DATA:  
HOW THE NYPD IS GETTING VISION ZERO WRONG 5, 10 (2016), 
https://www.transalt.org/sites/default/files/news/reports/2016/Death_Danger_and_Ign
oring_the_Data_How_the_NYPD_is_Getting_Vision_Zero_Wrong_2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8J34-TE8C]; see also NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., HIGH-VISIBILITY ENFORCEMENT ON DRIVER COMPLIANCE 
WITH PEDESTRIAN RIGHT-OF-WAY LAWS 30 (2013), https://www.nhtsa.gov/
sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/811786.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL35-YR76]; NAT’L HIGHWAY 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., THE EFFECT OF HIGH-VISIBILITY 
ENFORCEMENT ON DRIVER COMPLIANCE WITH PEDESTRIAN RIGHT-OF-WAY LAWS 1, 
17-18 (2017), https://one.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/812364_HighVisibilityEnfDriver
CompPeds4YearFollowUp.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EPJ-XQDK] (indicating that high 
visibility enforcement continues to have a deterring effect on dangerous driving four 
years after enforcement, with no similar enforcement during the interim). 
 129. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, SUMMARY OF MOTOR VEHICLE 
CRASHES 4 tbl. 7 (2015), https://dmv.ny.gov/statistic/2014-nyscrashsummary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZM8-J2CM] (showing the negligible effect tinted windows have on 
traffic crashes, injuries, and fatalities). 
 130. See supra Section III.A.3 for a discussion about the role and impacts of 
quality-of-life and broken taillight enforcement. 
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maximum deterrence, even at the expense of seeking more severe 
penalties; resources that are freed up as a consequence should be 
redirected to achieve more widespread enforcement.  Agencies 
should consider expedited and far more frequent drivers’ license 
suspensions and revocations, especially against people repeatedly 
convicted of dangerous driving offenses.131  Police should also 
increase the capacity to quickly investigate traffic injury crashes to 
improve the ability to penalize drivers, and to raise the expectation of 
swift apprehension and legal consequences.132 
B. Automated Enforcement Technology 
Despite positive deterrence effects from widespread and high 
visibility traffic enforcement, the likelihood of apprehension for 
driving offenses is limited by the size and resources of the police 
force.133  Even during police crackdowns, the likelihood of 
apprehension for speeding, drunk driving, red light running, and 
unlicensed driving remains low.  For example, one study estimated 
that approximately thirteen million violations occurred in one year 
across the United States by drivers failing to stop when a school bus 
stop-arm was engaged, with the vast majority of those violations 
unenforced.134  Additionally, the likelihood of apprehension for 
driving offenses is limited by the willingness of police to apprehend 
dangerous drivers, officers’ considerations of disruptions to traffic 
flow, safety issues related to stopping a driver, and responsibilities 
related to ticketing a driver, in the form of paperwork and potential 
                                                                                                            
 131. Enforcement agencies should also consider requiring the surrender of vehicle 
registration and license plates from repeat unlicensed driving offenders, given that 
unlicensed drivers are more than two-and-a-half times as likely to be involved in a 
fatal crash compared to licensed drivers. See Albert Sabat, Highest Fatality Rates 
from Unlicensed Drivers in California, ABC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/unlicensed-drivers-higher-rates-fatal-
crashes-california/story?id=18239481 [https://perma.cc/6BNQ-LZ3V].  Moreover, 
approximately half of the drivers who leave the scene of a fatal crash are unlicensed 
to drive. See AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, UNLICENSED TO KILL 14 (2011), 
https://www.aaafoundation.org/sites/default/files/2011Unlicensed2Kill.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/97QM-2UEW]. 
 132. See, e.g., VISION ZERO:  YEAR THREE REPORT, supra note 1, at 42 (discussing 
how the NYPD is considering expanding the criteria for when their Collision 
Investigation Squad responds to traffic injury crashes and conducts an investigation). 
 133. See generally Bruce L. Benson et al., Can Police Deter Drunk Driving?, 32 
APPLIED ECON. 357, 357-64 (2000). 
 134. See Bryan J. Katz, Camera Enforcement of School Bus Stop Arm Violations, 
Presentation at the NHTSA Symposium, School Transportation Safety:  Thinking 
Outside the Bus (Dec. 1, 2016), https://one.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/symposiums/december
2016/assets/Camera_Enforcement_School_Bus_Stop_Arm_Bar_Violations_Presentat
ion.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3KJ-CSVC]. 
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court appearances.135  Finally, implicit racial bias and use of force 
with potential lethal consequences are inherent risks of police traffic 
stops.136 
Automated enforcement technology provides a highly effective 
solution to address the challenges and limitations of traditional traffic 
enforcement.137  Today, speed and red light enforcement cameras are 
the most common automated enforcement technologies, while more 
recent types include cameras that detect offenses for failing to yield, 
illegally occupying a bus lane, and failing to stop for a stopped school 
bus with students boarding or exiting.138  The safety benefits from 
these technologies are significant.  In cities in Washington State with 
speed enforcement cameras, speeds dropped by thirty percent during 
the first year of a school zone speed safety program and violations 
decreased by eighty-two percent in the first six months.139  In NYC, 
the typical speed enforcement camera reduces speeding violations by 
fifty percent within its first year of operation,140 and reduces injury 
crashes within five hundred feet of a fixed speed camera by over 
                                                                                                            
 135. See Laurence H. Ross, The Neutralization of Severe Penalties:  Some Traffic 
Law Studies, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 403, 412 (1976); Joseph A. Schafer & Stephen D. 
Mastrofski, Police Leniency in Traffic Enforcement Encounters:  Exploratory 
Findings from Observations and Interviews, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 225, 226 (2005). 
 136. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 137. See generally KATHY LINDQUIST, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS:  SYNTHESIS (2007), http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/
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studies showing reductions in dangerous driving following the implementation of 
automated enforcement systems). 
 138. See Law Enforcement–Vision Zero, N.Y.C., http://www.nyc.gov/html/vision
zero/pages/law-enforcement/law-enforcement.html [https://perma.cc/5PT8-TX95]; 
Vision Zero, AM. TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, https://www.atsol.com/vision-zero 
[https://perma.cc/67TM-S47C].  For other types of increasingly popular technologies 
capable of detecting and reporting dangerous driving, including so-called in-vehicle 
“black boxes” and applications using mobile phone sensors, see N.Y.C. TAXI & 
LIMOUSINE COMM’N, VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGY:  SECOND REPORT (2016), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/second_vehicle_safety_technology_report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRW8-DS48]. 
 139. See CITY OF DES MOINES, SCHOOL SAFETY PROGRAM:  2012 ANNUAL 
REPORT, http://desmoineswa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/3009 
[https://perma.cc/WHN8-U3T9]; Nicholas Deshais, Spokane to Test Speed Cameras 
in School Zones, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/dec/11/spokane-to-test-speed-cameras-in-
school-zones [https://perma.cc/HHB7-SN7Z]. 
 140. See Mayor Bill de Blasio Announces 2015 Was Officially the Safest Year Ever 
on New York City Streets, N.Y.C. (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/069-16/mayor-bill-de-blasio-2015-was-officially-safest-year-ever-new-
york-city-streets [https://perma.cc/4TMA-SG7F]. 
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thirteen percent.141  Other cities which use speed enforcement 
cameras have reduced their fatal and serious injury crashes by thirty 
to forty percent.142  Red light cameras have reduced the number of 
injury and fatal crashes by thirty percent, even though their effect on 
the number of total crashes is uncertain.143  Part of the reason for 
these significant reductions is that automated cameras can identify far 
more violations than individual enforcement officers.  In 2016, speed 
enforcement cameras in NYC caught ten times as many speeding 
drivers as police officers did, issuing 1.37 million tickets compared to 
the 137,000 issued by police officers,144 a difference compounded by 
the fact that state law only allowed the operation of a small number of 
cameras during limited days and hours—restrictions that are common 
in the United States, where automated enforcement has faced 
political opposition in some jurisdictions.145  These numbers show that 
speeding is a widespread and constant occurrence, with police officers 
likely catching less than one percent of all speeding violations.146  
                                                                                                            
 141. See Jason Mick, Cash Grab or Life Saver? NYC Speeding Ticket Cameras 
Scrutinized in New Report, DAILYTECH (Feb. 25, 2015, 5:04 PM), 
http://www.dailytech.com/Cash+Grab+or+Life+Saver+NYC+Speeding+Ticket+Cam
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Injuries and Deaths?, COCHRANE (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.cochrane.org/
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 143. Amy Aeron-Thomas & Stephane Hess, ‘Red-light Cameras’ Cut Casualty 
Crashes at Junctions with Traffic Lights, COCHRANE (Apr. 20, 2005), 
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junctions-with-traffic-lights [https://perma.cc/RK95-Z7Q8].  For a more recent 
discussion on the benefits of red-light cameras, see Ben Fried, There Is No Doubt 
That Automated Traffic Enforcement Saves Lives, STREETSBLOG NYC (Feb. 20, 
2014), http://nyc.streetsblog.org/2014/02/20/there-is-no-doubt-that-automated-traffic-
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[https://perma.cc/W5PB-XAM7]. 
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Because of cost and personnel limitations, automated enforcement 
may be the only viable tool currently available to achieve the type of 
widespread, uniform, and sustained enforcement necessary to deter 
the most prevalent and dangerous traffic safety violations, and allow 
police resources to be redirected towards other public policy 
measures.147   
Additionally, automated enforcement technology is an 
indispensable tool to prevent the racial disparities and potentially 
lethal use of force that are inherent risks of traffic stops by police 
officers.  Enforcement cameras wholly avoid interaction between the 
driver and officer, which can benefit all parties, and they can be 
operated in ways that eliminate any possibility of racialized bias or 
targeting.148  Some cities operate their speed and red light 
enforcement programs without any involvement from police, which 
may increase the trust in the programs by communities exposed to 
illegitimate policing.  To further ensure that automated enforcement 
technology is considered legitimate, cities should ensure that resulting 
fines are kept low, devote all net revenue to traffic safety measures, 
maintain robust procedures to appeal tickets and ensure due process, 
educate the public about the safety benefits of the technology, and 
issue only warnings to drivers during the initial period of operation.149 
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Finally, automated enforcement technology likely provides the 
optimal solution to address the racial inequities that result from the 
negative socioeconomic effects of traffic-related penalties, and the 
race-based disparities of who is struck, injured, and killed in traffic 
incidents.  For example, although penalties in certain cities for 
violations caught by cameras are similar to those caught by police 
officers, some cities’ speed enforcement camera programs issue fines 
as low as fifty dollars without regard to the rate of speed in excess of 
the limit, and result in no punitive points on a driver or vehicle 
owner’s record, including their insurance record.150  This is in contrast 
to tickets issued by police officers for speeding, which can result in 
fines up to six hundred dollars, imprisonment, and punitive points on 
driving records and insurance records.151  As a result, for Black and 
Hispanic drivers, who are disproportionately low-income, the 
economic impact of a speeding ticket tends to be far less harmful 
when issued using automated enforcement technology rather than 
when issued by a police officer.  Moreover, a poll from 2016 found 
that Black, Hispanic, and lower-income New Yorkers are far more 
likely than other groups to support the introduction of more speed 
enforcement cameras.152  This shows that those disproportionately 
struck, injured, and killed in traffic, namely Black, Hispanic, and 
lower-income residents, also desire automated enforcement to 
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address those risks, more so than White and higher-income residents 
who are less likely to be harmed in traffic incidents. 
C. Achieving Constitutional and Just Traffic Enforcement:  Lessons 
Applied 
As discussed in Part III of this Article, racial disparities are 
common in discretionary police traffic stops, as shown by the high 
rates of African-American drivers stopped, searched, and subjected 
to use of force, and are also likely to exist for traffic-injury responses 
and traffic safety violations in the second enforcement stage of arrest, 
adjudication, penalties, and sentencing.  Some of the most tragic 
outcomes, including the deaths of African-American drivers Philando 
Castile, Walter Scott, and Samuel DuBose, occurred in connection 
with discretionary police traffic stops.  The worst possible outcomes 
of such stops could be avoided through procedurally just policing. 
To address racial disparities in traffic enforcement, police 
departments must focus enforcement on the most dangerous safety 
violations and drastically reduce pretextual discretionary stops.  
Officers must undertake frequent anti-racism, subconscious bias, and 
de-escalation training and education throughout their careers to help 
overcome individual race-making practices.153  To further address 
racial disparities and unconstitutional practices in discretionary and 
pretextual traffic stops, police leadership must institutionalize the rule 
that the only acceptable standard for a traffic stop is a specific and 
articulable danger or violation connected to a specific driver which is 
based on reasonable suspicion,154 and must require that consent-
based searches become the norm, unless an officer possesses a 
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L348-CK2Q]. 
 154. See EPP ET AL., supra note 62, at 161-62. 
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warrant or has probable cause.155  Further, individuals who are 
stopped should receive a card with written information about the 
stop, how to obtain more information about the incident and their 
rights, and how to file a complaint about their stop and search.156  
Finally, automated enforcement technology should be used 
extensively to limit interactions between armed police and drivers,157 
and the use of body cameras by police officers should be explored.  
These measures are necessary to achieve procedurally just policing, 
which also results in greater compliance with traffic safety laws.158 
To create agency accountability and help set a strategic plan to 
overcome decades of institutional racism, cities should commission 
third-party assessments on the role that race and the use of force play 
in enforcement, and should establish permanent independent 
community oversight of police empowered with significant 
investigatory and disciplinary abilities.159  To help identify racial 
disparities and measure progress to address them, police departments 
must also significantly increase transparency and provide aggregate 
non-personalized demographic and case outcome data online to the 
public.160  All minor offenses that are not significant causal factors in 
traffic injuries and fatalities, such as biking on the sidewalk, should be 
decriminalized so that such offenses result only in warnings, monetary 
fines, or minor civil sanctions.  Finally, police departments should 
help establish local restorative justice programs for drivers convicted 
of dangerous driving and offenses that caused a fatality or serious 
injury.  Such programs have been shown to reduce recidivism and 
achieve greater levels of procedural justice.161 
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D. Beyond Police Traffic Enforcement As We Know It 
The changes to police training, policies, and oversight, as outlined 
in Section V.C, have been applied with positive effects in some 
jurisdictions and are necessary steps for all cities seeking to address 
racial disparities and unconstitutional practices in traffic 
enforcement.162  There is strong evidence, however, that such changes 
will be insufficient to address those problems.163  Some analysis 
suggests that the commitments by agencies and “the most prominent 
proposals for addressing racial disparities in police stops will not 
work.”164  For example, a 1999 class action lawsuit, Daniels v. City of 
New York, challenged the NYPD’s practice of conducting stop-and-
frisks without the reasonable suspicion required by law.165  Upon 
settling the case in 2003, the NYPD agreed to train all existing and 
future police officers about the “legal and factual bases for 
conducting and documenting stop, question, and frisk activity” and in 
cultural diversity, integrity, ethics, and professionalism.166  Following 
this settlement, the number of stop and frisks exploded from 97,296 in 
2002, of which eighty-two percent of people stopped were not 
arrested or ticketed, to a high of 685,724 in 2011, of which eighty-eight 
percent were not arrested or ticketed and eighty-seven percent 
involved Black or Hispanic individuals, even though those two groups 
made up only fifty-two percent of the city’s population.167  In effect, 
eight years after the 2003 settlement and a commitment to agency-
wide trainings intended to address the alleged unconstitutional stops, 
the NYPD conducted more of such stops with even higher disparities.  
This led to yet another class action suit, Floyd v. City of New York.168  
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A remedial order in that case by the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York in 2013 found that the NYPD had 
violated the Fourth Amendment, by conducting unreasonable 
searches, and the Fourteenth Amendment, by systematically 
conducting stops and frisks in a racially discriminatory manner.169  
Only in 2014, eleven years after the first settlement, did the number 
of stops fall below the 2002 levels.170  Moreover, in 2015 the NYPD’s 
Inspector General reported that the NYPD has “historically . . . failed 
to discipline officers who use force without justification,”171 and a 
federal district court described the NYPD as an agency that had 
become “accustomed to disregarding” court orders.172 
The history of the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices indicates that 
racial disparities and unconstitutional policing practices will persist in 
traffic enforcement, even after local governments commit to and 
implement changes in police training, policy, and oversight.  The lack 
of substantial improvement indicates that the problem is institutional 
and entrenched throughout police departments.  As a consequence, 
police departments should devote nearly all traffic enforcement 
resources to crash responses and investigations, and to high-visibility 
enforcement against the most dangerous and frequent traffic safety 
violations.  Police should also prohibit pretextual discretionary traffic 
stops “except when justified by an overriding public safety 
exigency,”173 and should empower unarmed traffic enforcement 
agents, in place of armed police officers, to enforce most dangerous 
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driving offenses.  Finally, local governments should apply widespread 
automated enforcement technology, operated and controlled by non-
police agencies, to target dangerous driving offenses. 
CONCLUSION 
Vision Zero can only be achieved if cities fully embrace the two 
new E’s:  equity and evaluation.  Engineering, education, and 
enforcement must be guided by data-driven, intersectional, and 
inclusionary analyses that consider age, gender, geography, and socio-
economic condition, as well as race and historical inequities in each 
area.  Cities must target the most dangerous common driving offenses 
by making enforcement highly visible, uniform, widespread, and 
sustained, vastly expanding automated enforcement, and eliminating 
nearly all discretionary police stops.  This will help achieve the 
greatest public deterrence against dangerous driving and avoid the 
worst outcomes of racially biased, unconstitutional, and illegitimate 
policing.  Not only is just policing a moral obligation, it is a requisite 
tool for optimal deterrence, efficient use of public resources, and 
fostering vital public trust and engagement.  Without fully addressing 
racial biases and disparities in traffic enforcement, we will never be 
able to reach Vision Zero. 
